Taḥqīq mā li-l-hind min maqūlah maqbūlah fī al-ʿaql aw mardhūlah

(Verifying All That the Indians Recount, the Reasonable and the Unreasonable)

by

al-Biruni
^{Abū Rayḥān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Bīrūnī}

An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Geography, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, Laws and Astrology of India (ca.1030 CE)

PREFACE

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

^[i.3] No one will deny that in questions of historic authenticity hearsay does not equal eyewitness; for in the latter the eye of the observer apprehends the substance of that which is observed, both in the time when and in the place where it exists, while hearsay has its peculiar drawbacks. But for these, it would even be preferable to eyewitness; for the object of eyewitness can only be actual momentary existence, while hearsay comprehends alike the present, the past, and the future, so as to apply in a certain sense both to that which is and to that which is not (i.e. which either has ceased to exist or has not yet come into existence). Written tradition is one of the species of hearsay-we might almost say, the most preferable. How could we know the history of nations but for the everlasting monuments of the pen?

The tradition regarding an event that in itself does not contradict either logical or physical laws will invariably depend for its character as true or false upon the character of the reporters, who are influenced by the divergence of interests and all kinds of animosities and antipathies between the various nations. We must distinguish different classes of reporters.

One of them tells a lie, as intending to further an ^[i.4] interest of his own, either by lauding his family or nation, because he is one of them, or by attacking the family or nation on the opposite side, thinking that thereby he can gain his ends. In both cases he acts from motives of objectionable cupidity and animosity.

Another one tells a lie regarding a class of people whom he likes, as being under obligations to them, or whom he hates because something disagreeable has happened between them. Such a reporter is near akin to the first-mentioned one, as he too acts from motives of personal predilection and enmity.

Another tells a lie because he is of such a base nature as to aim thereby at some profit, or because he is such a coward as to be afraid of telling the truth.

Another tells a lie because it is his nature to lie, and he cannot do otherwise, which proceeds from the essential meanness of his character and the depravity of his innermost being.

Lastly, a man may tell a lie from ignorance, blindly following others who told him.

If, now, reporters of this kind become so numerous as to represent a certain body of tradition, or if in the course of time they even come to form a consecutive series of communities or nations, both the first reporter and his followers form the connecting links between the hearer and the inventor of the lie; and if the connecting links are eliminated, there remains the originator of the story, one of the various kinds of liars we have enumerated, as the only person with whom we have to deal.

That man only is praiseworthy who shrinks from a lie and always adheres to the truth, enjoying credit even among liars, not to mention others.

It has been said in the Qur^ᴐān (Koran), "Speak the Truth, even if it were against yourselves" (Sūra 4:134); and the Messiah expresses himself in the Gospel to this effect: "Do not mind the fury of kings in speaking the Truth before them.
^[i.5] They only possess your Body, but they have no power over your Soul" (cf. Matt. 10:18, 19, 28; Luke 12:4). In these words the Messiah orders us to exercise moral courage. For what the crowd calls courage-bravely dashing into the fight or plunging into an abyss of destruction-is only aspecies of courage, while the genus, far above all species, is to scorn death, whether by word or deed.

Now as justice (i.e. 'being just') is a quality liked and coveted for its own self, for its intrinsic beauty, the same applies to truthfulness, except perhaps in the case of such people as never tasted how sweet it is, or know the truth, but deliberately shun it, like a notorious liar who once was asked if he had ever spoken the truth, and gave the answer, "If I were not afraid to speak the truth, I should say, no." A liar will avoid the path of justice; he will, as matter of preference, side with oppression and false witness, breach of confidence, fraudulent appropriation of the wealth of others, theft, and all the vices that serve to ruin the world and mankind.

When I once called upon the master ^ᴐAbū-Sahl ^ᴄAbd al-Mun^ᴄim Ibn ^ᴄ Alī Ibn Nūḥ al-Tiflīsī, may God strengthen him! I found that he blamed the tendency of the author of a book on the Mu ^ᴄtazila sect to misrepresent their theory. For, according to them, God is omniscient of himself, and this dogma that author had expressed in such a way as to say that God has no knowledge (like criticism of the knowledge of man), thereby misleading uneducated people to imagine that, according to the Mu^ᴄtazili, God is ignorant. Praise be to God, who is far above all such and similar unworthy descriptions! Thereupon I pointed out to the master that precisely the same method is much in fashion among those who undertake the task of giving an account of religious and philosophical systems from which they slightly differ or to which they are entirely opposed. Such misrepresentation is easily detected in a report about dogmas comprehended within ^[i.6] the frame of one single religion, because they are closely related and blended with each other. On the other hand, you would have great difficulty in detecting it in a report about entirely foreign systems of thought totally differing both in principle and details, for such a research is rather an out-of-the-way one, and there are few means of arriving at a thorough comprehension of it. The same tendency prevails throughout our whole literature on philosophical and religious sects. If such an author is not alive to the requirements of a strictly scientific method, he will procure some superficial information which will satisfy neither the adherents of the doctrine in question nor those who really know it. In such a case, if he be an honest character, he will simply retract and feel ashamed; but if he be so base as not to give due honor to truth, he will persist in litigious wrangling for his own original standing-point. If, on the contrary, an author has the right method, he will do his utmost to deduce the tenets of a sect from their legendary lore, things which people tell him, pleasant enough to listen to, but which he would never dream of taking for true or believing.

In order to illustrate the point of our conversation, one of those present referred to the religions and doctrines of the Hindus by way of an example. Thereupon I drew their attention to the fact that everything which exists on this subject in our literature is secondhand information which one has copied from the other, a farrago of materials never sifted by the sieve of critical examination. Of all authors of this class, I know only one who had proposed to himself to give a simple and exact report of the subjectsine ira ac studio ('without anger or zeal'), namely ^ᴐAbū al-^ᴄAbbās al-Irānshahrī. He himself did not believe in any of the then existing religions, but was the sole believer in a religion invented by himself, which he tried to propagate. He has given a very good account of the doctrines of the Jews and Christians as well as ^[i.7] of the contents of both the Torah and the Gospel. Besides, he furnishes us with a most excellent account of the Manichaeans, and of obsolete religions of bygone times that are mentioned in their books. But when he came in his book to speak of the Hindus and the Buddhists, his arrow missed the mark, and in the latter part he went astray through hitting upon the book of Zarkan, the contents of which he incorporated in his own work. That, however, which he has not taken from Zarkan he himself has heard from common people among Hindus and Buddhists.

At a subsequent period the master 'Abū-Sahl studied the books in question a second time, and when he found the matter exactly as I have here described it, he incited me to write down what I know about the Hindus as a help to those who want to discuss religious questions with them, and as a repertory of information to those who want to associate with them. In order to please him I have done so, and written this book on the doctrines of the Hindus, never making any unfounded imputations against those, our religious antagonists, and at the same time not considering it inconsistent with my duties as a Muslim to quote their own words at full length when I thought they would contribute to elucidate a subject. If the contents of these quotations happen to be utterly heathenish, and the Followers of the Truth (Muslims) find them objectionable, we can only say that such is the belief of the Hindus, and that they themselves are best qualified to defend it.

This book is not a polemical one. I shall not produce the arguments of our antagonists in order to refute such of them as I believe to be in the wrong. My book is nothing but a simple historic record of facts. I shall place before the reader the theories of the Hindus exactly as they are, and I shall mention in connection with them similar theories of the Greeks in order to show the relationship existing between them. For the ^[i.8] Greek philosophers, although aiming at truth in the abstract, never in all questions of popular bearing rise much above the customary exoteric expressions and tenets both of their religion and law. Besides Greek ideas we shall only now and then mention those of the Ṣūfīs or of some one or other Christian sect, because in their notions regarding the transmigration of souls and the pantheistic doctrine of the unity of God with creation there is much in common between these systems.

I have already translated two books into Arabic, one about the origines ('sources,' or 'beginnings') and a description of all created beings, called Sāṁkhya, and another about the emancipation of the Soul from the fetters of the Body, called Patañjali (Pātañjala?). These two books contain most of the elements of the belief of the Hindus, but not all the single rules derived therefrom. I hope that the present book will enable the reader to dispense with these two earlier ones, and with other books of the same kind; that it will give a sufficient representation of the subject, and will enable him to make himself thoroughly acquainted with it-God willing!